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Abstract
A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology—one with origins in Plato’s
Meno—concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the
value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere (unknown) true opinion. The recent
literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One
point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be at
the personal level, the level at which states of subjects or agents, as such, appear. We
take exception to this orthodoxy, or at least to its unquestioned status. We argue that
subpersonal states play a significant—arguably, primary—role in much epistemically
relevant cognition and thus constitute a domain in which we might reasonably expect
to locate the “missing source” of epistemic value, beyond the value attached to mere
true belief.
Keywords Subpersonal cognition · Epistemic value · Virtue epistemology ·
Philosophy of cognitive science
1 Epistemic value and the swamping problem
The past decade or so has witnessed a ‘value turn’ in mainstream epistemology (Riggs
2008). Of particular interest have been matters connected to epistemic value, value
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arising from the existence of distinctively intellectual goods, in contrast to, for example,
moral or aesthetic goods (Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2007, 2011; Haddock et al. 2009;
Baehr 2009). The investigation of epistemic value has generated various puzzles, one
of which owes its existence partly to a compelling piece of received wisdom: that the
epistemic value of knowledge outstrips that of mere true belief1; it may, for instance, be
epistemically valuable to believe some true proposition <p> via a fortunate guess, but
it is even more epistemically valuable to know that <p>. A subject who, for example,
works stepwise through a proof of logical theorem T1L and, as a result, correctly
affirms T1L’s status is in a better epistemic state than the person who unthinkingly
spits out ‘yes, it’s a theorem’ as a mere guess or only because, say, that person likes
the font in which T1L is set. And this is the case, to reiterate, even though both subjects
end up with a true belief about T1L’s status as a theorem.
This apparent truism makes mischief in the following way. Consider what would
seem to be an equally plausible principle: whatever we say about the value of knowl-
edge must be consistent with what we say about the nature of knowledge (Kvanvig
2003). If we accept that the epistemic value of knowledge exceeds that of mere true
belief, we should not endorse an analysis of knowledge foreclosing that very possibil-
ity; rather, our analysis of knowledge must comport with an account of its constituents
(e.g., justification or warrant) such that, plausibly, being justified (or warranted) adds
value to what would otherwise be a merely true belief. But, some influential accounts
of knowledge have struggled to satisfy this conditional constraint.
Take, for example, a straightforward process-reliability account of knowledge,
according to which knowledge is type-identical to reliably produced true belief (Gold-
man 1979; Olsson 2007). If the process reliabilist maintains that the epistemic value
of knowledge exceeds that of mere true belief, it is incumbent upon her to demonstrate
just how the epistemic value of reliably produced true belief could exceed the value
of mere (that is, not reliably formed) true belief. Here the reliabilist runs into trouble.
Consider Zagzebski’s telling comparison (Zagzebski 2003): an already good-tasting
cup of coffee takes on no additional gustatory value simply in virtue of its being the
product of a machine that reliably produces good-tasting cups of coffee; likewise, it is
unclear how a true belief would become additionally epistemically valuable if turns
out that the belief is not only true, but also the product of a reliable belief-forming
process.2 It seems that the epistemic value of truth “swamps” the value of reliabil-
ity (Kvanvig 2003, pp. 47–48). But—and here’s the bad news for reliabilism—if the
epistemic value of truth swamps the epistemic value of reliability, then it is false
that the epistemic value of reliably formed true belief exceeds the epistemic value of
mere (unreliably formed) true belief. Thus, the reliabilist’s account of the nature of
knowledge appears not to be consistent with the assumption that the epistemic value
of knowledge exceeds that of mere true opinion.
And though this swamping problem (Kvanvig 2003, 2010; Zagzebski 2003; Jones
1997; Pritchard 2009b; Swinburne 1999; Sylvan 2017) is often treated as an objection
specifically to (at least standard forms of) reliabilism, it threatens other analyses of
1 In Plato’s Meno, Socrates asserts (uncharacteristically) that he knows this, if he knows anything at all.
See Kvanvig (2003, Ch. 1) for discussion.
2 Kvanvig (2003) makes a parallel point in terms of the value of chocolate.
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knowledge in like fashion (Kvanvig 2003, 2010; Pritchard 2009a, b): in the case of
any account of knowledge which aims to uphold the plausible assumption that the
epistemic value of knowledge exceeds that of mere true belief, whatever conditions
must, according to that account, be satisfied by knowledge must themselves be such
that their satisfaction adds epistemic value to a true belief. And, virtually all otherwise
promising theories of knowledge (or warrant, or justification) seem to flounder in the
face of this challenge.3
Responses to the swamping problem typically take one of three forms: validation-
ist, fatalist, or revisionist (Pritchard 2009a, pp. 19–20). Validationists (e.g., Greco
2010; Goldman and Olsson 2009; Olsson 2007, 2011) argue that, when knowledge is
understood properly, the epistemic value of knowledge is not swamped by the value
of true belief. By contrast, fatalists (e.g., Baehr 2009; Ridge 2013) argue that we cir-
cumvent the swamping problem by rejecting the underlying intuition about the value
of knowledge. Maybe, as this line of thought goes, knowledge is not as valuable as
we initially thought it was. Finally, revisionists (e.g. Kvanvig 2003, 2010; Pritchard
2009a, b, 2010; Riggs 2009) agree with fatalists that knowledge lacks a distinctive
epistemic value, one not shared by mere true belief, while claiming that it is on closer
inspection something else—typically understanding—which possesses the distinctive
sort of epistemic value mistakenly attributed to knowledge.
2 The swamping problem and the personal/subpersonal distinction
2.1 The orthodox view
Despite deep disagreement about how best to solve the swamping problem, all parties
seem to agree where to look in conceptual space: if there is a solution, it is to be found at
the personal level. What is the personal level? In broad strokes, it is the realm of states of
persons “as such, as experiencing, thinking subjects and agents” (Davies 2000a, p. 88,
summarizing Dennett’s original thought when introducing the idea of a distinctively
personal level of explanation or description).4 Although the distinction between the
personal and subpersonal levels is frequently taken for granted, the details could use
some sorting out. Such sorting out is not our project here. Thus, in the remainder,
we will simply follow precedent and take accessibility to consciousness—typically
operationalized as reportability—and suitability for appearance in folk psychological
and rationalizing explanations as the primary marks of personal-level status.5
3 Pritchard (2010) has suggested that, among existing contenders, robust virtue epistemology (e.g. Sosa
2007; Greco 2010) boasts resources most likely to vindicate the value of knowledge in the face of the
swamping problem. However, at least as Pritchard sees it, robust forms of virtue epistemology are materially
inadequate. And, perhaps more germane to present purposes, virtue-theoretic proposals are not sufficiently
informative when pitched at the personal level, a concern we develop in more detail below.
4 Dennett introduced the distinction (1969, p. 93) as a difference in styles of explanation (or between sets
of explanatory vocabularies). In our discussion, we focus on the corresponding ontological questions—of
personal-level states, properties, or processes – as is frequently done in the contemporary literature.
5 Davies (2000a, pp. 88–90, 2000b, p. 46) focuses on these characteristics of personal-level states and
processes, as do Shea (2013, pp. 1064–1065) and Frankish (2009, pp. 90–91); on the messiness of the
personal-subpersonal distinction, see Drayson (2012, 2014).
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The standard formulation of the swamping problem presupposes a contrast between
knowing and merely truly believing, and both belief and knowledge are widely thought
to be states of whole persons as such; one’s beliefs (neat and as components of knowl-
edge states) are typically available to introspection, and even more straightforwardly,
they are clear candidates for inclusion in rationalizing and folk psychological expla-
nations of one’s actions. Moreover, these personal-level states are thought by many to
have a distinctive sort of content; in fact, it is sometimes claimed that the kind of con-
tent had distinctively by personal-level states is the only genuine form of content and
that only this sort of content has such genuine epistemic properties as carrying justifi-
catory force (McDowell 1994a, b). Generally, the consensus holds that personal-level
states—beliefs, memories, perceptions—and justification-relevant relations between
them provide the subject matter of epistemology and thus that, if a solution is to be
found to the swamping problem, it will be found there—in the nature of personal-level
states and relations between them or between their contents.
We take exception to this orthodoxy, or at least to its unquestioned status. After
all, the further cognitive science has progressed, the greater the extent to which its
results—some of which we will describe in Sects. 3 and 4—have marginalized the
personal level in its accounts of human behavior (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Wegner
2002; T. D. Wilson 2002; Lau et al. 2007; Haybron 2007; Schwitzgebel 2008; Alfano
2013; Harman 2000; Doris 2002; Gendler 2008). Given the state of the empirical
evidence, then, it makes good sense for epistemologists to look to the subpersonal
level. We contend that such exploration holds promise, that subpersonal states and
their content6 play a significant role in epistemically relevant cognition—particularly
in cases in which there is no substantive model of what one might think should be the
corresponding personal-level state or process—and thus constitute a domain in which
we might reasonably expect to locate the (or, at least a) missing source of epistemic
value, beyond the value attached to mere true belief.
2.2 Methodological remarks
Two preliminary comments about our argumentative strategy are in order. First, we
do not press the following, relatively trivial point: that all personal-level states or
processes are grounded in, enabled by, or realized by physical states or processes,
or supervene on physical states or processes (of the brain, it is typically thought).
A broad consensus in philosophy of mind and epistemology accepts some form of
physicalism—typically cashed out as a claim about realization or supervenience—and
we do not intend merely to endorse that consensus. We have a narrower point in mind.
We claim that, in some cases, personal-level states have epistemic value the source
6 Although we emphasize the role of so-called subpersonal-level states and take the content of such states to
be relevant to questions about epistemic value, we do not commit ourselves to a distinctive form of content
at the subpersonal level. It might be that the content of the relevant subpersonal states is of the same sort
as the content of supposed personal-level states, but that the state-types are different (cf. Heck 2000, which
makes a parallel point regarding the conceptual-nonconceptual distinction). That is to say, we might solve
the swamping problem by moving the discussion to the subpersonal level, though the content found at that
level might or might not differ in its nature from the kind of content typically supposed to appear at the
personal level.
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of which seems mysterious viewed from the standpoint of the personal level. In such
cases, there is no straightforwardly identifiable personal-level process or set of relations
that might account for the value of such states. Yet, when one takes the subpersonal
perspective, the source of epistemic value comes more clearly into view. The matter
might be best seen as involving a structural mismatch: in the cases at issue, a minimal
amount of structure appears at the personal level, while a more richly structured process
appears at the subpersonal level; as a result, the attempt at personal-level analysis falls
short for want of explanatory resources, while, in contrast, subpersonal-level structure
and processes offer plentiful explanatory resources, many of them relevant to questions
of justification, or so we will argue.
Second, although our arguments in Sects. 3 and 4 presuppose a relatively demand-
ing criterion of adequacy for a validationist response, it is not as demanding a criterion
as some might wish. We tend to agree with Duncan Pritchard (2013, p. 12) that ‘in
general and all other things being equal, we desire to be knowers as opposed to being
agents who have mostly true beliefs but lack knowledge’. Showing that this desire
is not misguided does not require showing that, in every instance (actual or possi-
ble), knowledge that P is more valuable than mere true belief that P. If a successful
validationist response were to require meeting the strong (we believe, unduly strong)
demand that all possible items of knowledge have a value that exceeds the value of
their corresponding true belief tokens, then the arguments we develop below would
likely come up short. However—as Kvanvig (2003) himself has argued at length—it’s
not at all obvious that there is, at the end of the day, any way of defending a validation-
ist response if such a strong modal criterion of adequacy is assumed. And, this point
gains further traction when (following Sosa 2000, see also David 2001; Lynch 2009)
one reflects on the tension between the strong modal criterion of adequacy and the
apparent ‘pointlessness’ of attaining knowledge of trivial truths (e.g., truths about the
number of grains of sand on an arbitrary section of a beach). The reader should bear in
mind, however, that we do not aim to satisfy only the exceptionally weak demand that
in some actual cases, knowledge that P has more epistemic value than the mere true
belief that P. Rather, we aim to satisfy an intermediate and practically relevant demand:
to show that in a wide range of actual cases involving human subjects, knowledge that
P has more value than the mere true belief that P.
With these points in mind, here is the plan. Section 3 relates our shift in perspec-
tive—from the personal level to the subpersonal level—specifically to extant, proposed
personal-level solutions to the swamping problem on behalf of the process reliabilist
(Olsson 2007) and virtue epistemologist (Greco 2010), arguing that such proposals
show more promise when recast at least partly in subpersonal terms and supplemented
accordingly. In Sect. 4, we move into entirely uncharted territory, by proposing and
defending two arguments directly in support of a subpersonal validationist solution
to the swamping problem, a solution we defend as legitimate with reference to the
weaker criterion of adequacy that Pritchard seems to have in mind and which isn’t
predicated upon what are perhaps overoptimistic assumptions about what it is that
should be validated.
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3 Subpersonal transformations of personal-level proposals
In this section, we argue, in 3.1, that one extant reliabilist attempt to solve the swamp-
ing problem—viz. Olsson’s (2007) argument from increased practical value—faces
what appear, from the empirical standpoint, to be insurmountable hurdles. Upon con-
sideration of further empirical results, we conclude that Olsson’s central claim—that
justification confers value by conferring stability—has more plausibility when one
focuses on subpersonal processes the structural images of which do not appear at
the personal level. In Sect. 3.2, we consider what is taken to be the most promising
personal-level response to the swamping problem currently on offer—viz. the solution
offered by (robust forms of) virtue epistemology (e.g., Greco 2010)—and argue that
a subpersonal variation on this approach has more to recommend it.
3.1 Process reliabilism
Erik J. Olsson (2007) argues that “reliabilist knowledge promotes successful action
over time…[because]…reliabilist knowledge promotes stability and…stability is con-
ducive to successful action over time” (ibid., 349). According to Olsson, when an
unreliable process produces a (mere) true belief that P, the very unreliability of that
process will likely undercut or neutralize, eventually, that belief’s potential to con-
tribute to successful action. A given subject deploys a given mechanism or runs a
given process-type (we treat these as equivalent for present purposes) repeatedly over
the course of her life. In the cases in question, the process-type is, by hypothesis, unre-
liable; thus, the preponderance of later applications of it—that is, those that occur after
the time at which the application of the process led to the fixation of the subject’s true
belief that P—will yield false beliefs, which will likely lead to unsuccessful action.
As Olsson sees things, subjects track the sources of their belief, recording which pro-
cesses produce which beliefs as well as the rate of past success and failure of various
processes to produce beliefs that lead to effective action. Thus, a subject who contin-
ues to use the process in question will subsequently doubt or reject P; given feedback
from the world, the subject will detect the falsity of the outputs of the majority of later
applications of the process that produced P, which results will call into question P
itself (even though P is, in fact, true), thereby robbing the true belief that P of what
would have been its contributions to successful behavior—presumably because the
subject abandons, or at least take a highly qualified attitude toward, the belief that P,
and thus does not act on it.7
7 This work builds on the simpler idea (Goldman and Olsson 2009) that having a reliably produced true
belief is better than having a true belief produced by an unreliable process, because one’s having a reliably
produced true belief probabilifies one’s having true beliefs in similar circumstances in the future. While
this may be correct, it does not seem to increase the value of any individual belief. A true belief’s having
been produced by a reliable process entails the presence of a valuable tool in the subject, a tool such that, if
the subject continues to possess and deploy it, it will produce a preponderance of true beliefs in the future.
It is not clear, however, why the value of the possession of that tool would increase the value of a given
belief produced by it, beyond the value the belief has in virtue of its truth. Instead, a belief’s having been
produced by a reliable process seems to be merely an indicator that the subject possesses a tool to produce
true beliefs reliably (in certain kinds of circumstances); the relational fact of a belief’s having been produced
by a reliable process would seem to confer only a diagnostic role on that belief.
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To be clear, to the extent that Olsson’s tack succeeds, it does not provide what many
would want from a response to the swamping problem: an account of why a justified
true belief that qualifies as knowledge has more final (i.e., noninstrumental) value than
a mere true belief. Rather, it focuses on a particular kind of instrumental value, viz.
the value that a justified true belief has in virtue of its being likely, itself, to continue to
contribute to successful action. Nevertheless, the account does generally make sense
of the intuition that justified true belief is more valuable than (mere) true belief, given
the incredible importance of successful action in human lives.
Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that a proposal along the lines of Olsson’s
holds promise. Whence does it draw its explanatory power, the personal level or the
subpersonal level? At what level does the connection between justification and value-
qua-stability appear? As noted above, Olsson supposes that agents generally record
which beliefs were produced by which mechanisms and keep a running success rate
of each mechanism. If the agent were not successfully deploying such record-keeping
abilities, she would not infer the likely falsity of P from later failures of the P-producing
process to yield beliefs that support successful action. So far as we can tell, then, this
is meant to be a proposal about personal-level states. In Olsson’s words, his proposal
“requires that the agent maintain a mental record, a record in her mind, of how beliefs
were acquired” (Olsson 2007, p. 352).
A fleshed-out version of Olsson’s story would seem to require that, relative to each
use of a given belief-forming mechanism, the subject accurately encode, not just that
the mechanism produced the belief in question, but also the context of such production,
represented at correct level of specificity. Too often, a mechanism that has a weak track
record in a context described at one level of specificity (use of vision while beneath
the surface of the water in a naturally formed lake) has a stronger track record relative
to a more inclusive set (use of vision simpliciter), or vice versa—points familiar from
discussions of the Generality Problem for process reliabilism.8
Assume a given true belief P was produced by a mechanism in a context that would
be appropriately individuated, for the purpose of determining P’s level of justification,
at a fine grain, and that relative to such a context, the mechanism is in fact unreliable.
Let us say, too, that the subject mistakenly individuates, in her record-keeping process,
the context in question in a coarser-grained way relative to which the mechanism in
question is, in fact, reliable. In this case, the subject will not weed out the unjustified
belief that P, because she will treat the contexts of the application of the mechanism
in question in a coarser-grained fashion and will not come to see—on the basis of
negative feedback from the world in the relevant finely individuated contexts—the
mechanism that originally produced the belief that P as unreliable. If this is a rela-
tively common phenomenon—if the subject doesn’t identify and record contexts at
the correct grain—the subject’s various unjustified true beliefs may well persist and
continue to contribute to successful behavior, contra Olsson’s prediction; the subject
will think of P as the result of the operation of a reliable mechanism (the visual system
applied to the general spatial layout, for example), which generally gets things right,
instead of seeing the mechanism as being applied in more finely individuated context
(the visual system as applied in poor light to objects at a distance moving quickly), and
8 For a recent influential discussion of this problem, see Lyons (2019).
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thus won’t abandon her unjustified belief that P.9 Similarly, without accurate records
of the sort in question, the subject may well treat a justified true belief as unjustified
and abandon it in accordance with Olsson’s schema. Thus, absent a commitment to the
reasonably accurate tracking and recording of justification-relevant contexts of belief-
formation, one should doubt that Olsson’s schema identifies the distinctive source of
value attached to justification.
How plausible is it, then, that human subjects track, at the personal level, the output
of belief-forming mechanisms in contexts? Below we survey the relevant empirical
literature, but let us be clear, from the outset, about the sort of evidence we should
look for on Olsson’s behalf. It should show that, at the personal level, (a) subjects
track the sources of their beliefs (and the contexts of their formation—take this as
read in what follows), (b) subjects do so reasonably accurately, (c) subjects use that
information to calculate reasonably accurate track records of their various belief-
producing mechanisms, and (d) subjects bring the results of those calculations to bear
on commitments to past products of their belief-producing mechanisms (for example,
to bear on the judgment that a past doxastic output of a given mechanism is likely
to be true) and adjust accordingly. Moreover, given that Olsson’s account of how
justification adds value (by creating stability) is pitched at the personal level, we
should expect subjects to be able to report accurately on the states and processes in
question in connection with (a–d). This sets a very high bar, to be sure, and, perhaps
unsurprisingly, the empirical literature runs in the opposite direction, supporting at
least a moderately pessimistic view about every one of these desiderata and, more
importantly, a firm skepticism concerning their joint satisfaction. The literature in
question is enormous, but we shall, in what follows, convey a sense of the obstacles
faced by Olsson’s personal-level account.
Consider first the so-called illusory-truth effect (Hasher et al. 1977; Dechêne et al.
2010). Mere exposure to sentences increases the likelihood that subjects will judge
them to be true when asked later about them. This occurs even in cases in which
subjects know better, that is, even when they have stable beliefs that contradict the
information to which they’re being exposed experimentally (Fazio et al. 2015). The
leading explanation of this phenomenon appeals to a more general and well-established
subpersonal construct, ease of processing, in this case created by previous exposure
(Begg et al. 1992).10 Further results reinforce this hypothesis: merely setting (unfa-
9 This kind of concern is not merely theoretical. For instance, the sort of source information that some
languages encode syntactically marks sources only at a very coarse grain—distinguishing between such
categories as having been acquired by testimony or having been observed first-hand (Tosun et al. 2013).
10 Some such patterns of judgment are accompanied by a reported sense of confidence (a “sense of know-
ing”) the strength of which reliably increases with, e.g., the number of past exposures to the sentence in
question. We should not, however, take such a reportable sense of knowing to indicate that the processes
producing the judgments concerning truth or validity—processes exhibiting ease-of-processing effects, for
instance—operate at the personal level. Such a criterion would be too weak, for it would miscategorize
paradigmatically subpersonal-level processes as personal. Consider textbook approaches to speech pro-
cessing, the best known of which is Chomskyan generative grammar. It’s widely accepted that subjects’
conscious sense of what’s grammatical and what’s not—their “linguistic intuitions”—provides important
data in theory construction in this domain. But, the theories so constructed involve processes (computa-
tional sensitivity to the presence of ‘wh’-traces, that no subject can report, for instance) that are subpersonal
if any cognitive processes are. Similarly, consider processes operative in face recognition. A reportable
sense of familiarity with a given face may correspond with the face’s having been categorized correctly.
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miliar) sentences in an easier-to-process font increases the probability (over sentences
set in a more difficult to read font) that subjects will judge them to be true after a
single previous exposure (Reber and Schwarz 1999). In such cases, subjects simply
are not attending accurately to the sources of their beliefs or to the mechanisms pro-
ducing them. If they were aware, at the personal level, that a mere ease-of-processing
mechanism were producing the beliefs in question—responding only to, for instance,
previous exposure to written text with no attached credibility—subjects would, pre-
sumably, not make the judgments they do.
The illusory truth results are by no means outliers. Empirical work documents
various kinds of cases in which subjects fail to track the sources of their beliefs and
mechanisms that produced them (see Marsh et al. 2008, for a review). In a well-known
list-learning paradigm, for example, subjects are exposed to a list of semantically
interrelated words and asked later about words that would have “fit” onto the list (but
weren’t on it); subjects frequently judge that these words were listed. Subjects seem
to have both a false belief and to make a false judgment about the source of that belief,
thinking they heard or read the word when it was instead self-generated (by a subper-
sonal process of semantic association). And, in some versions of such experiments,
the personal-level record is strikingly corrupted; subjects report phenomenological
experience—a rich episodic memory—of, for instance, the experimenter having read
the nonlist word aloud, even though it is only a lure and was not in fact read aloud
(Roediger and Gallo 2005; see Geraci and Franklin 2004 for cases in which subjects are
misled by nonsemantic linguistic relations). In eyewitness suggestibility experiments,
subjects report having witnessed what are actually false details that experimenters have
in one way or another exposed the subjects to after the witnessing of the actual event
in question; subjects confuse testimony-based belief-formation (verbal or in print) for
first-person observations made at, for example, the scene of a car accident (Loftus
1979). A different line of research shows that déjà vu can be induced experimentally,
by means of mere exposure, which again seems to be a mistake about sources (Brown
and Marsh 2010). Subjects are susceptible to the false fame effect, incorrectly cat-
egorizing faces as being those of famous people, as result of mere past exposure to
said faces in experimental settings (Jacoby et al. 1989a, b). And, subjects are more
likely to choose the wrong subject from a line-up when they’ve seen that person’s face
in a book of “mug shots” prior to viewing the line-up (Brown et al. 1977). Subjects
also make source errors when recalling the factors that influenced their decisions, in a
way that systematically supports decisions made (Mather et al. 2000), attributing, for
example, positive features to the option they chose, even when those positive features
were actually attached to the option not taken. In addition, the effects of social conta-
gion powerfully distort memory of sources (Meade and Roediger 2002; Barnier et al.
2008). And bear in mind that in every one of these cases—as well as in the cases of
memory-related results discussed in the remainder of this subsection—the measures
used involve at least some (and often exclusively) personal-level judgments.
Footnote 10 continued
But, this personal-level sense of familiarity puts subjects in no position to report on the structure of the
process that extracts the fine-grained geometrical features of faces and that produces successful acts of face-
recognition—by, for instance, calculating the distance, in a multi-dimensional feature space, of the face
currently represented from various exemplar faces (that is, standing representations of known individuals’
faces). That process is clearly subpersonal.
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Results on source credibility should be especially troubling to Olsson. In some
cases, subjects’ beliefs about the credibility of the source of an individual piece of
information significantly affect their judgments: when they believe that a piece of
information is from a credible source, they’re significantly more likely to judge it
true. But, even then, they have such poor memory for the actual sources of individual
memories (Begg et al. 1992, p. 452) that, statistically speaking, the actual credibility
of the source is not correlated with the subjects’ pattern of endorsements (Henkel and
Mattson 2011, p. 1708). Moreover, subjects continue to categorize as true approxi-
mately 50% of statements they believe (rightly or wrongly) to be from a noncredible
source (Begg et al. 1992, pp. 451–453). The picture that emerges is of subjects who are
not completely insensitive to considerations of credibility, but who have (1) mediocre
source memory, (2) often make poor use of credibility information they have, and (3)
who continue to make widespread errors concerning other matters to do with sources.
Considering the multi-step, statistical nature of the procedure Olsson demands, such
shortcomings compound. As a result, there’s no reason to believe of any particular
mechanism in a given subject, that the subject will have a sufficiently accurate record
of the performance of that mechanism and will take it into consideration in the for-
mation of new beliefs or the continued endorsement of belief previously produced by
that mechanism.
To be fair, some experimenters have gone to significant lengths to try to warn
subjects about credibility or to get them to use information about credibility to mitigate
the formation of or reliance on false memories (Echterhoff et al. 2005; Henkel and
Mattson 2011; Chambers and Zaragoza 2001; Meade and Roediger 2002; Begg et al.
1992). These efforts are not wholly without results, but neither do they instill much
confidence in human abilities or tendencies. To the extent that such warnings have
salutary effects (reducing eyewitness suggestibility effects, for example), the effects
are weak, depend on the specific choice of wording (the warning should be given in the
indicative, not the subjunctive), and on the timing of the warning (warnings are more
effective if they’re provided before the “false testimony” not after). This last point,
in particular, stands in direct tension with Olsson’s framework. On Olsson’s account,
warnings that a belief-producing mechanism “lacks credibility” come only after the
mechanism’s production of the original belief in question; in the case of a merely
true belief that P, the belief lacks stability because later on it becomes apparent to the
subject that the mechanism that produced it is producing further beliefs that fail to guide
successful action. And, even in the specific cases in which the warnings work well, for
instance, eliminating the effects of misinformation, this amounts only to the subjects’
treatment of planted information in the same way as subjects treat new information (that
is, stimulus items first introduced at the time of later memory tests or retests). But, given
how badly subjects perform on newly introduced material—for example, given the high
rate at which subjects falsely claim that newly introduced items were present in the
earlier study material—Olsson will find little consolation here. It would be one thing if
prewarnings could somehow get subjects to track sources reliably enough to engage in
the personal-level feats of memory required by Olsson’s framework. But it’s another to
be told merely that prewarnings can prevent subjects from being misled by previous-
exposure effects, but that subjects in these cases nevertheless do not very reliably
judge whether they’ve ever been exposed to a given stimulus item (that is, whether
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the current experience has a source in memory at all). Notice, too, that the beneficial
effects are relatively short-lived (Chambers and Zaragoza 2001, p. 1122), which further
undermines Olsson’s picture. For on his framework, the “warning of unreliability” is
likely to come well after the fact—when, significantly later, the mechanism in question
produces further beliefs that do not support successful action. Even if the subject
is given a prewarning that alerts her to the potentially misleading ways of a given
source, if, before long, she stops paying attention to said warning, the benefits of
circumspection will have been lost by the time she must, on Olsson’s account, notice
that a mechanism that produced the merely true belief that P is now producing beliefs
that fail to support successful action.
Perhaps it is unsurprising, on general theoretical grounds, that subjects lack the
capacity for reportable, detailed memory that Olsson’s framework requires. Marcia
K. Johnson and collaborators (Johnson et al. 1993) developed the leading theory
of the monitoring of sources of information and memories. Put simply, Johnson’s
source-monitoring framework grounds subjects’ ability to identify the source of a given
memory in the ability to associate the content of the memory itself with various cues
and features of the context in which the memory was formed. Viewed in that light, the
various results reviewed above may seem unsurprising, given the general remember-to-
know (or, R-to-K) shift (Barbar et al. 2008; Dewhurst et al. 2009) exhibited by human
memory: the general tendency for information about the specific circumstances to be
lost over time and for the supposed knowledge to be represented context-free. This
distinction parallels (and may be largely coextensive with) the widely made distinction
between episodic and semantic memory (Tulving 1972) and the tendency of memories
for general information about the world to shift from episodic form—replete with
details concerning the context in which the information was acquired—to the semantic
form, which encodes the information itself stripped of such details. To the extent that
recall includes detailed information, it is typically reconstructed by a process that
allows, relatively easily, for error to creep into the representation of those details.
In sum, the breadth and the depth of subjects’ personal-level mistakes—their
failure to mark sources at all, their failure to mark sources accurately, their fail-
ure to use accurate information that they have—puts paid to Olsson’s commitments
concerning personal-level record keeping in humans. Why do we say ‘personal-
level’? The experimental literature reviewed above relies primarily on personal-level
responses—deliberate responses given in full awareness of explicit instructions from
experimenters, sometimes instructions that explicitly ask about subjects’ conscious
experiences. But, for our purposes, it need not be the case that all of the failings
revealed by this literature count as personal-level failings. We proceed to argue that
some empirical evidence supports a subpersonal reinterpretation of Olsson’s frame-
work. To the extent, however, that the literature surveyed above reveals subpersonal
mnemonic failings, this dampens the prospects of even a subpersonal reading of Ols-
son’s framework. Recall, though, that the compound thesis of the present subsection is
conditional in the relevant respect: Olsson’s personal-level story concerning the way
in which justification is connected to value-qua-stability is implausible; and if any
version of that story is plausible, it is a subpersonal one. This thesis is consistent with
there being no plausible version of Olsson’s story about the way in which justification
gives rise to value-qua-stability.
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What empirical support might there be for a subpersonal reading of Olsson’s
proposal?11 We must concede that, given the determination of the personal by the
subpersonal, every personal-level failure is, in some sense, a subpersonal one. Thus,
regardless of how we categorize subjects’ responses in the various experiments alluded
to above—as personally or subpersonally governed responses—all of the negative
results discussed cut against a subpersonal version of Olsson’s story. It’s worth noting,
however, some reasons for tempered optimism about a subpersonal fleshing-out of
Olsson’s approach. Cognitive scientists have documented various ways in which the
cognitive system tracks temporal patterns and sources, for example, in the Iowa Gam-
bling Task (as performed by normal subjects—see Bechara et al. 2005) and in tasks that
exhibit frequency effects (Jones et al. 2013). Also, the grammatical marking of sources
of information can affect the accuracy of memory. In some languages, obligatory dif-
ferences in, for example, verb inflections mark whether the event being reported was
seen by the speaker or, instead, learned about by testimony. Such markings enhance
subjects’ memories for sentences marked as reports of first-hand observations, pre-
sumably because subjects treat first-hand observation as epistemically superior to
testimonial acquisition, and first-hand verb-inflection triggers application of this bias
(Tosun et al. 2013). Such results suggest that the subject tracks at least some of the
“sources” of her beliefs subpersonally.12
Now consider the Iowa Gambling Task in which subjects receive rewards and penal-
ties for drawing cards from a variety of decks; some decks have a much more profitable
structure than others. For instance, in one deck, 10 out of 11 cards pay out $50 per
card, while the eleventh shows a loss of $250, which equals an expected utility of
approximately $23 dollars per draw. In another deck, 10 out of 11 cards pay $100 per
card, while its eleventh shows a loss of $1250, which equals an expected utility of
approximately − $23 per draw). Many subjects eventually achieve a conscious aware-
11 Some readers might wonder whether it’s worth pursuing the matter any further. After all, one could
cast Olsson’s proposal in more straightforward terms: justification confers stability on a belief and stability
is valuable—end of story. In contrast, we’re inclined to think that any proposed solution to the swamping
problem worth its salt must identify, in a relatively convincing manner, the knowledge- or justification-based
source of epistemic value, in this case, the plausible relation by which justification produces value-qua-
stability. Olsson would seem to agree, and thus he offers his (personal-level) account of the way in which
reliabilist knowledge promotes stability—the account we criticize in the main text. In what follows, we argue
that a subpersonal version of Olsson’s line of thought offers at least as much promise as (and probably more
promise than) his personal-level version of it, and we do so in an attempt to identify a plausible connection
between justification and value (that is, to identify something specifically to do with knowledge that confers
value on knowledge states, by creating stability). We do not, however, attempt to show that there can be no
personal-level account of the connection between justification and value-qua-stability other than the one
Olsson offers. Perhaps such a further personal-level account will be developed, or has been and we have yet
to encounter it. We are open to that possibility. Bear in mind that there are at least two important questions
in play. First, we should like to know what value-constituting property a knowledge-state might have. The
right answer may well be “stability.” Second, one might ask “What does a state’s being knowledge have
to do with that state’s being valuable-qua-stable?” We take this to be a deep question about the epistemic
source of the value at issue, its source in the properties the co-instantiation of which constitutes a state’s
being knowledge; we focus on the latter question in connection with Olsson’s proposal.
12 In the experiments of Tosun, subjects receive instructions meant to reduce personal-level attention to
credibility-related questions: “To make the study phase more similar to a natural language situation in which
participants would not be attempting to remember the sentences or the source of evidence, participants were
told that the experiment was about their ability to comprehend sentences and their reading times would be
measured.” (Tosun et al. 2013, p. 125).
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ness of the superiority of winning decks over losing decks, but prior to that point (if
it ever comes), subjects have no such awareness, yet they nevertheless systematically
modulate their selections in favor of the winning decks, while also showing physio-
logical signs of a sensitivity to threat of loss when beginning to reach for losing decks.
Thus, prior to the point of personal-level awareness, a subpersonal pattern-tracking
process runs in the absence of any corresponding personal-level process. Moreover,
the subpersonal process tracks a pattern of financial payout from sources and is thus
analogous to a pattern of “epistemic payout” from sources, a pattern of the sort that
Olsson’s account requires us to track at the personal level.13
We acknowledge the limited scope of the evidence of subpersonal source tracking
and evaluation. In contrast, the wealth of evidence against a personal-level story of
the sort Olsson has in mind seems damning. We close this subsection, then, with a
conditional conclusion: If Olsson’s strategy pays off at all, it will do so as a subpersonal-
level account of processes that produce instrumental value; justified true beliefs are
more valuable than merely true beliefs because the operation of certain forms of
subpersonal processing increases the likelihood that a subject will continue to act on
a true belief when it’s produced by a reliable (and thus justified) process, as compared
to beliefs produced by unreliable processes.
3.2 Virtue epistemology
As a personal-level account of the source of epistemic value, virtue epistemology holds
apparent promise, for it seems to have the resources to articulate a cogent, personal-
level solution to the swamping problem.14 According to a virtue-based approach,
knowledge is true belief the correctness of which is because of , or which manifests
intellectual virtue on the part of, the agent (Zagzebski 1996; Sosa 2007; Greco 2010;
Haddock et al. 2010). In this section, we argue, however, that a subpersonal variation
on the virtue epistemologist’s proposed solution to the swamping problem fares better
than an exclusively personal-level account.
13 Our point is not that two processes, a personal-level process and a subpersonal level one, run in parallel
and that the subpersonal process is the more metaphysically or explanatorily fundamental of the two,
providing the genuine explanation of epistemic value, in opposition to a personal-level explanation that
might also be able to do the job. Rather, there is no personal-level process of the sort Olsson describes
(that’s what we take the empirical evidence to have shown); such a process appears only at the subpersonal
level, if it appears at all. Thus, our criticism of Olsson’s personal-level proposal in no way rests on any
claim about causal-explanatory exclusion or the relation between realizers and realized states or between
supervening properties and their supervenience base. Note that this is an example of structural mismatch.
There is no appropriate record-keeping structure at the personal level, so nothing about the personal-level
fact of a (true) belief state’s being justified accounts (in Olsson’s suggested way) for its production of value
(i.e., of stability). In contrast, that connection does stand a reasonable chance of appearing at the subpersonal
level (or so we’ve argued). Bear in mind that we seek a kind of solution to the swamping problem that turns
us away from potential conceptual truths about the connection between justification and stability (or any
other source of epistemic value). Our criterion of adequacy requires that we understand how it is that in
many cases involving actual humans, justification (or warrant) adds value to merely true belief, but without
committing ourselves to any necessary truth about such addition.
14 This point has been conceded in various places by Pritchard (e.g., 2009a, b, 2010), who is a leading
critic of robust virtue epistemology.
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For ease of exposition, we focus on John Greco’s (2010) canonical presentation of
the virtue-theoretic response to the swamping problem. According to Greco, knowl-
edge is a cognitive success (i.e., the attaining of a true belief) that is because of cognitive
ability. Furthermore, achievements are defined more generally as successes that are
because of ability. Thus, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, the achievement of
a true belief reached through ability. Achievements are valuable for their own sake
(in a way mere lucky successes are not); therefore, knowledge, qua achievement, is
valuable for its own sake.15
Let us grant for the sake of argument that knowledge is a cognitive success because
of cognitive ability, and thus, that knowledge is always and everywhere a kind of
achievement (it is success because of ability). Even on these assumptions, the thesis
that knowledge is valuable for its own sake, in a way that mere (unknown) true belief
is not, follows only if being reached through ability or virtue suffices to make a true
belief more valuable than its nonknown counterpart. But why should this be?
At this juncture, Greco takes a nod from Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics,
Aristotle distinguishes between achieving an end through luck and achieving the end
through the exercise of one’s abilities (or virtues). The latter, according to Aristotle
(as Greco 2010 summarizes):
is both intrinsically valuable and constitutive of human flourishing … In this
discussion Aristotle is clearly concerned with intellectual virtue as well as moral
virtue: his position is that the successful exercise of one’s intellectual virtues is
both intrinsically good and constitutive of human flourishing (2010, pp. 97–98).
The claim that “the successful exercise of one’s intellectual virtues is intrinsically
good” is put forward as an explanation for why knowledge, conceived of as a kind
of successful exercise of intellectual virtue, is valuable in a way that unknown true
belief is not. But to say that successful exercise of intellectual virtue is intrinsically
valuable means just this: that exercising one’s intellectual virtues is good for its own
sake in virtue of properties that are internal to the successful exercising of intellectual
virtue.16
Now, this may be where explanation comes to an end; perhaps there’s nothing help-
ful to say except that the successful exercise of virtue is valuable because of whatever
of whatever intrinsic properties it has that make it valuable. It is not unreasonable to
wish, however, for something more, to hope for elucidation of the relation between
the successful exercise of cognitive virtue and epistemic value. In the remainder of
this section, we argue that a move to the subpersonal level does shed further light on
the matter; it illuminates at least part of the source of the value in question, in a way
that an entirely personal-level virtue-theoretic proposal, on its own, does not.
Consider one way a virtue epistemologist might add meat to the personal-level
account of epistemic value. Intellectual virtues, as such, must be truth-oriented dispo-
sitions that are appropriately cognitively integrated (e.g., Pritchard 2010; Greco 2010,
p. 156, passim) within the agent’s cognitive character, a point that is embraced else-
15 This is a condensed version of the argument found in Greco (2010).
16 This way of thinking about intrinsic value owes originally to Moore (1903). For a more recent extended
discussion, see Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen (2000).
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where by Greco himself when distinguishing true beliefs reached through virtues from
true beliefs reached through reliable but ‘strange and fleeting processes’, the exercise
of which issue beliefs that, even when true, fall short of knowledge.17 Cognitive suc-
cesses that involve “the successful exercise of intellectual virtue” (i.e., that which the
virtue epistemologist tells us is intrinsically valuable) are thus cognitive successes
the formation of which is grounded in truth-oriented dispositions that are stable and
integrated, as opposed to being merely fleeting or disintegrated. The properties of
a truth-oriented disposition in virtue of which it is cognitively integrated within the
agent’s wider cognitive character are thus properties in virtue of which it is valuable.
What are these properties?
These appear to be subpersonal properties. Here we consider two ways in which
cognitive integration, of the sort adverted to by the virtue epistemologist, appears as a
subpersonal phenomenon. The first involves the very nature of cognition. The second
involves processes by which individual states or abilities become integrated into an
existing cognitive system.
Questions about cognitive integration and cognitive systems have arisen forcefully
in the recent debates in the philosophy of mind, particularly in connection with the
Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) (Clark and Chalmers 1998) and the proposal that
groups sometimes constitute cognitive systems (Hutchins 1995; Huebner 2013). A
prominent thread in the debate over EMH can be summarized as follows: To the
extent that Clark and Chalmers consider personal-level states (in the context of, e.g.,
their discussion of Otto and his notebook), their arguments for the extended view
bog down (Rupert 2004, 2009, 2013). If, as they indicate, they wish to support the
extended view of the mind by appeal to its causal-explanatory superiority—one that
privileges natural kinds typed coarsely enough to include a significant number of real-
world instances with partly external minimal supervenience bases—there must be a
successful science of personal-level cognition that individuates cognitive state-types
very coarsely. But, there’s very little extant science of this sort; cognitive science tends
to produce fairly fine-grained models.
At this juncture, one naturally turns to cognitive science in search of a boundary
that distinguishes cognitive from noncognitive causal contributors to the production of
intelligent behavior. One such strategy appeals to the line between causal contributors
that appear within the relatively persisting, relatively integrated cognitive system (as
a whole—that is, the system roughly equivalent to the individual’s entire mind or self)
and those that appear beyond the boundary of that integrated system (M. Wilson 2002;
ºRupert 2009). This requires, however, some specification of a measure of integration.
Rupert appeals to various conditional probabilities of mechanisms’ co-contribution
to the production of the subject’s intelligent behavior. The view is not without its
problems (Klein 2010; de Brigard 2017), and competing proposals have been made.
For example, drawing on the work of Sporns and his colleagues (Sporns et al. 2004),
Goldstone and Gureckis appeal to a measure of computational complexity (Goldstone
and Gureckis 2009, p. 428; also see Clark 2008, p. 251, n24) to characterize the sort
17 See here Greco’s (2010, p. 156) diagnosis of Plantinga’s (1993) brain lesion case. For a related discussion
of cognitive integration and its connection with virtue epistemology, see Pritchard (2010) and Menary
(2012). For discussion of cognitive integration in the context of the extended mind debate, see Menary
(2010).
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of integration characteristic of an integrated cognitive system. And, Edwin Hutchins
proposes that a steep drop-off in the computational gradient (“steep gradients in the
density of interaction among [representational] media”) marks the boundary of the
cognitively relevant unit of analysis (Hutchins 1995, p. 157). For present purposes, we
emphasize only that, as it has taken shape, the debate clearly concerns subpersonal-
level properties of the cognitive system. For, the states in question do not appear to
be of the sort to which folk psychological or rationalizing explanations appeal, and
there’s no reason to think that subjects have conscious access to the states or proper-
ties in question. For example, the sort of computational complexity at issue for Sporns
and Goldstone and Gureckis concerns such features as the density and clustering of
information-passing channels that connect different components of the cognitive archi-
tecture, such as whether those patterns consist in a so-called small-world architecture
(dense local clustering with a small number of “long-range” connections) or whether
the various computationally specialized subunits are fully connected—every one con-
nected directly to every other. Hutchins gives no indication of thinking that subjects
can identify by introspection the fact that the genuine components of their cognitive
systems are the ones within the boundary set by the steep gradient in computational
processing.18 Thus, to the extent that progress is being made on issues of cognitive
integration, in connection with the extended-mind debate, it is only where contributors
“descend” to the level of subpersonal processes.
Now consider a different sort of integration, the way in which newly acquired
skills and memories are integrated into the subject’s cognitive profile. One especially
striking stage of the integration process occurs during sleep. Sleep consolidates skills
and memories, and it does so in a way that allows a new motor routine or the content
of new experiences to be incorporated into the cognitive system’s overall functioning;
this is partly a matter of maintaining balance with and facilitating behavior-controlling
cooperation with other bodily skills and other parts of one’s store of memories. The
latter case often goes under the heading of memory consolidation, the process by which
memories are cemented (relatively speaking), in contrast to being lost or eliminated
(as the records of most of our experiences are). A central and relevant aspect of
memory consolidation is described by Dudai, Karni, and Born: “Consolidation is a
dynamic, generative, transformative, and lingering process that is posited to balance
maintenance of useful experience-dependent internal representations of the world with
the need to adapt these representations to the changing world” (2015, p. 21). And,
this consolidation process is of particular importance in the case of propositional
knowledge: “There is also growing evidence that this sleep-associated redistribution
of information is accompanied with an increased semantization of memories and the
18 Compare Tononi’s phi-based theory of consciousness. Although Tononi takes consciousness to consist
in a certain sort of informational integration, he does not claim to have arrived at that theory by introspection.
A subject might be able to report, de re, on variations in informational integration, simply by reporting on
the extent to which a percept seems vivid or is similar to another; but the subject has no conscious access
to the fact that what she is reporting on is variation in the highly complex quantitative measure phi (Tononi
2008, p. 220). Phi is the reduction- or supervenience-base of the property of something’s being conscious,
not the introspectively available content of a personal-level conscious state. Note too that Clark’s interest
in measures of integration reflects his interest in a story about the realizers or “local material supervenience
base” (Clark 2007, p. 186) of personal-level states; that’s what’s at issue in his disagreement with Rupert
(and others).
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abstraction of gist information from episodic representations” (ibid., 23), and “the
hypothetical process of systems consolidation is most commonly discussed within
the context of declarative memory” (ibid., 26). Moreover, the reconsolidation process
appears to be directed at, and triggered by the need to, integrate declarative memory
into existing bodies of represented facts, of the sort relevant to inference: “Hence, one
may hypothesize that, instead of external cues, reactivated pre-existing schemas in
neocortical sites direct sleep-dependent consolidation, for example, by favoring the
hippocampal reactivation of that memory information that fits the preexisting schema”
(ibid., 25), “[P]rior knowledge schemata shape the engagement of the hippocampus
in declarative consolidation…” (ibid., 26), and “At the same time, one should not
overlook the postulated role of consolidation in balancing stability and change and
maintaining adaptive predictive power of representations” (ibid. 28).
These may be strange-sounding processes, but their basis is not fleeting; it reflects
fundamental operations of the cognitive architecture. Furthermore, the processes in
question clearly are not at the personal level; subjects have no conscious access to the
fact that copies of recordings of experiences, temporarily stored in hippocampus are
being re-encoded in frontal cortex; and that fact is not recognized by folk psychology
or adverted to in rationalizing explanations of action. There’s no sense in which the
agent herself shunts those traces from one bit of cortex to another, except the degen-
erate sense in which the agent does everything that happens at the subpersonal level,
such as detecting zero-crossings in early visual processing (Marr 1982). And, notice
that it’s not simply a matter of cementing memories or practiced routines; it’s simulta-
neously the maintenance of all of the subject’s existing cognitive activities and skills;
for the incorporation of anything new into that system involves the careful adjustment
of relations among existing structures as well as relations to new ones, so as to main-
tain the integrated functioning of the entire system, including its justification-related
functioning, for example, in inference.19
In conclusion, if we wish to understand the kind of cognitive integration appeal
to which fills the large explanatory lacuna in the virtue-epistemologist’s proposed
solution to the swamping problem, we do best to look—particularly at the point where
Greco’s explanation bottoms out—to the subpersonal level. Only there, it seems, do we
find the structure and complexity that adds significant explanatory power to the virtue-
epistemologists appeals to integration, such structure and complexity as sheds light
both on what constitutes the appearance of a single integrated set of cognitive virtues
and how such integration is dynamically maintained within a single cognitive system,
in response to new information or pieces of evidence. On the virtue-based account,
value flows from the exercise of intellectual virtues, which must be understood as part
of an integrated psychology, integrated with regard to knowledge structures and to
cognitive abilities. Such psychological integration is, however, a subpersonal matter.
19 For more on memory consolidation, see Rasch and Born (2013) and Squire et al. (2015). Approaching
the issue of integration from a slightly different angle, consider the problem of catastrophic interference,
which afflicts many neural network models of learning and remembering; this problem arises when the
changes in weights involved in the storage of a new pattern “overwrite” weights that encode previously
stored patterns or associations. See Ans et al. (2004) and Srivastava et al. (2014) for (clearly subpersonal)
attempts to solve this problem in what might be neurologically realistic ways.
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4 Straightforwardly subpersonal processing
In this section, we argue directly for subpersonal solutions to the swamping problem,
sans any detour through extant, personal-level accounts of the value of knowledge.
Presently, we develop two arguments each of which rests on a subset of the following
background assumptions:
Correspondence: In order for a belief to be true, its propositional content must
correspond to reality.
Compositionality: It is a necessary condition on a belief’s being a belief that
P that the belief’s components represent, express, or refer to the individuals,
relations, properties, etc. constitutive of P.
Belief Endurance: In order that a subject’s belief be the same belief at two points
in time, it must be an attitude toward the same proposition at both of those
points; more generally, for any two beliefs B1 and B2 (separated in whatever
way) to be type-identical beliefs, B1 and B2 must be attitudes toward the same
proposition.20
Subvenience: It is a nomologically necessary condition for a belief’s continuing
to be held that the subject who holds it continue to be in some subpersonal state(s)
or other that subvenes (or realizes) the belief in question.
Ongoing State: Although the acquisition of a new belief might be an event with
a terminus, having a belief is itself an ongoing state (Vendler 1957).
Maintenance: Having a justified belief is not only a matter of having a belief
acquired under appropriate circumstances; it is also a matter of sustaining that
belief in an appropriate way.
A few words are in order regarding these assumptions. Firstly, note that Correspon-
dence, Compositionality, and Belief Endurance are all implied by orthodox thinking
about various aspects of the possession conditions for true beliefs (at a time or over
time).21 The remaining three assumptions require elaboration. Subvenience articulates
a necessary condition for belief retention, namely, that the continued existence of a
belief depends on the continued existence of an (that is, some or other) appropriate
subvening base.22
20 Compositionality and Belief Endurance together provide a plausible path to belief-alteration: the repre-
sentation of a component of P might change, which changes the belief in question (it is no longer a belief
that P). We acknowledge the possibility, however, that the content of a belief might change in some other,
more holistic manner. The second argument below, put specifically in terms that presuppose a combinatorial
semantics for belief states, might well be recast in a way not so focused on the changes in the referents
of “sub-sentential” components, although we make no attempt to work out such an alternative formulation
here.
21 Note, moreover, that our use of ‘proposition’ is meant to be neutral with respect to the metaphysics of
propositions; our assumptions align with what Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) call ‘The Simple View’
according to which propositions are taken at least to play certain functional roles characteristically attributed
to propositions—viz. as the primary bearer of truth values, the objects of agreement or disagreement, etc.
22 The subvenience assumption, it should be clear, is stated at a level of generality such that it is applicable
to occurrent beliefs and dispositional beliefs alike. Even if one is not occurrently believing a proposition
P, one may nonetheless dispositionally believe P, provided one is disposed to affirm P and has the relevant
content stored in memory (which allows for a variety of supervenience bases). If the memory trace is lost,
so is the dispositional belief. For further discussion of this distinction, see Schwitzgebel (2015, §2.1). Note
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Ongoing state and Maintenance, which one of us has defended in detail in previous
work, should not be controversial. Nonetheless, some contemporary writers on epis-
temic value obscure the point. In particular, consider again Zagzebski’s analogy with
coffee production. The idea in play was that a good-tasting cup of coffee takes on no
additional gustatory value simply in virtue of its being the product of a reliable coffee
machine.23 From this point, we are invited to conclude—by parity of reasoning—that
it is unclear how a true belief would become additionally epistemically valuable if
turns out that the true belief was not only true, but also the product of a reliable
belief-forming process.
Consider a different analogy. The project of maintaining a pleasant home is
rather unlike the project of making a cup of coffee. The property of being well-
maintained—even though it contributes instrumentally to the home’s being a pleasant
home—is not a property that could be ‘swamped’ by the value of an already pleasant
flat. After all, if the flat is going to continue to be pleasant, it will have to go on being
well-maintained as the home continues to persist; and accordingly, the property of
being well-maintained can continue to confer value to the home indefinitely (Carter
et al. 2013, p. 256). What separates beliefs that are candidates for knowledge (i.e., ones
which are justified) from mere true beliefs is precisely what separates (by analogy)
more generally ongoing states that are positively evaluable from those that are not; the
former are sustained through good maintenance that the latter are not.
We propose that oftentimes (even if not always) subpersonal, justification-
conferring processes—of the very sort that can help to explain why true beliefs arrived
at via cognitively integrated virtues are more valuable than otherwise—underlie the
continuing existence of a belief.24 In many cases, for example, a belief (or perhaps bet-
ter, a proto-belief) does not persist absent certain subpersonal justificatory processes.
The belief no longer exists—either by the elimination of its subvening states or by the
alteration of its content so as to make it a different belief state—if it is not effectively
justified in an ongoing manner. In fact, in a wide range of cases, it is highly unlikely
that a human subject has—for very long, anyway—a merely true belief. After all, if
it is a true, belief-like state but does not become cemented by subpersonal processing
that is also justification-conferring—such as memory-consolidation—it is oftentimes
eliminated, either by a change in content or by the elimination altogether of its sub-
personal basis.
Footnote 22 continued
that dispositional beliefs are importantly different from dispositions to believe. The content apposite to the
former must be at least stored in memory for the dispositional belief to persist. In contrast, a subject may
have dispositions to believe (but not dispositional beliefs) contents she has never explicitly represented. For
the canonical presentation of this distinction, see Audi (1994).
23 The thought seems to be that, once one has a good-tasting cup of coffee, it remains good, or to the extent
that it does not, the degradation of flavor likely results from, for example, chemical interactions with the
surrounding gas molecules, independent of the production process; the goodness of the flavor of the two
cups of coffee is, by hypothesis, a function of the appearance of the same chemical profile in them when
the process that created them terminates, which screens off, from the differing processes of production, the
later chemical interactions that lead to the degradation of flavor.
24 Note that such justification-conferring subpersonal processes may allow for the subject to be epistem-
ically responsive (e.g., to potential signs of unreliability) even if the subject never becomes consciously
aware of any signs of unreliability. These are points that have been echoed in the literature on predictive
processing and the Bayesian brain (e.g., Clark 2015).
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Argument 1
A1. Premise 1. In many cases, in order that an initially formed belief-like state be
maintained long enough for it to become a full-fledged belief state, its subpersonal
realizer(s) must be integrated into the cognitive system.
A1. Premise 2. In order that a belief endure over a significant period of time, its
subpersonal realizer(s) must continue to survive integration-related subpersonal
routines.
A1. Premise 3. The kinds of integration referred to in the two preceding premises
contribute to the belief’s justificatory status in ways that have no structural parallel
at the personal level.
A1 Premise 4. In contrast, a belief-like state that is merely true is typically not
integrated into the cognitive system or is not maintained after formation, and thus
is likely either never to become a full-fledged belief or to be eliminated in relatively
short order.
A1 Premise 5. On the assumption that being true provides some noninstrumental
value, a justified true belief has—diachronically—more of it than a nonexistent
belief or a belief-like state that is eliminated after a brief existence.
A1 Premise 6. Given A1 Premise 3, the account of this difference in value is dis-
tinctively subpersonal.
Therefore, in the cases in question, there is a straightforward—even if not traditionally
explored—sense in which justified true beliefs are more noninstrumentally valuable
than what would be the relevant merely true beliefs; and the account of this noninstru-
mental value is distinctively subpersonal.
Let us clarify and elaborate on three points. Firstly, note that scope of the first
premise—viz., ‘in many cases’. This aligns our argument with the criterion of adequacy
defended at the outset. We are not attempting to show that, necessarily, for any subject
and any P, her knowledge state that P has more epistemic value than would her merely
true belief that P. But, neither do we intend to show merely that it’s possible that there
be a subject such that some of her knowledge states are more valuable than would
be the corresponding merely true belief. Rather, we mean to establish a substantive
conclusion intermediate in strength and relevant to the human pursuit of knowledge:
that for actual human subjects (and presumably those in nearby possible worlds), a
great many of her knowledge states are such that they are more valuable than would
be her merely true belief with corresponding content.
Secondly, we should make clear what sort of belief-cementing and belief-
maintaining cognitive processes we have in mind. Central to our conception of such
processes are those described in the final portion of the preceding section, pertaining
to memory consolidation. The role of such processing clearly supports A1P4, for if
memory consolidation and the related justification-related integration do not occur, the
memory in question is eliminated; if it’s not cemented, it simply vanishes. That’s the
nature of memory consolidation; what is not consolidated is lost (although a nuanced
treatment of the point would of course deal in probabilities).
But, to add further depth to the discussion, consider the process of checking for
consistency. One might imagine this would occur consciously, via the conscious con-
templation of the relation between one’s newly acquired belief (or belief-like state)
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and the rest of one’s beliefs. One concentrates on the content of the belief and the
contents of one’s other beliefs and checks the set for consistency or other, perhaps
more robust, coherence-related relations. To the extent that one has justification for
one’s existing beliefs, consistency or coherence with them provides justification for a
newly formed belief (or belief-like state).
There’s good reason to think that humans do not implement anything in the vicin-
ity of this personal-level ideal. According to Christopher Cherniak’s calculations,
the combinatorial explosion entailed by any effort to check explicitly for consistency
would sink any such effort (Cherniak 1986). The subpersonal cognitive system instead
uses all manner of computing tricks, typically beyond the ken of the conscious mind,
to try to maintain consistency, without depending on deliberate, conscious, serial,
personal-level calculation. Some such processes occur during slow-wave sleep, as
part of a process of reactivating and strengthening representations of facts. As a result
of this process, the beliefs in question will not only be justified, but will also be in
a position to justify other beliefs, a position that is explained by subpersonal pro-
cessing. Moreover, this process puts a belief in a position to be further justified by
other personal-level states. Your observation of a new dog in the neighborhood might
undergo consolidation and integration in a way that creates justificatory power for
your resulting belief B. But, it also situates B in a collection of beliefs, including other
beliefs about dogs, pets, ownership, etc., such that those other beliefs are more likely
to maintain or increase justification for B, when appropriate. This results partly from a
declarative memory’s integration into existing knowledge-schemas, as happens during
the consolidation (and reconsolidation) process described by Dudai et al. (2015). In
the cases in question, the only available account of the sources of this justificatory
positioning lies at the subpersonal level. Sleep-based memory consolidation involves
no personal-level process to which a theorist might appeal.
We do not claim that contemporary cognitive science has yielded a complete and
well-confirmed theory of the subconscious processes at issue; but it is highly plausible
that any promising heuristic owes its efficacy to subpersonal processing. Consider
consistency again. Imagine that a manageable number of randomly selected belief-
realizers are activated at various times and, at each time, the active set is subject to
a manageable process of consistency checking. How does one select beliefs (or their
subvening structures) randomly? It boggles the mind, unless one allows some kind of
fast, automatic search process, say, the selective activation of a subset of one’s beliefs
by the operation of an algorithm that samples from codings of them.25
25 In the field of artificial intelligence, it is relatively common to exploit, in various ways, the strategy of
sampling values and inferring from the properties of the sampled set something about the properties of
a larger set of data or portion of the world not directly accessible to the agent. (See Russell and Norvig
2011, sectios 14.5 and 15.5.3, which discuss approximate inference in Bayesian networks.) To be clear, the
current point is not that the human brain is using, for instance, Markov chain Monte Carlo simulations to
maintain epistemic hygiene, only the weaker point that current work in AI at least provides some clue to
the sort of strategy that might be used by the brain to maintain epistemic hygiene, given that such hygiene
is generally not maintained via conscious reflection on our belief and evidence sets. Note well that such
processes, if they occur in humans, are (as memory consolidation processes are) clearly subpersonal. To the
extent that the kind of sampling, replaying, and reactivation processes in question appear in humans, they
are not available to consciousness and do not appear in folk psychological explanations or in rationalizing
explanations that assign normatively governed belief-desire pairs to agents to account for their actions.
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Thirdly, we have used the language of being ‘belief-like’ to refer to states that
appear in the early stages of belief-formation and that either are or might well become
beliefs. We do not insist on this terminology, but we do hold that for many initially
acquired or formed states of the belief-like, information-encoding sort, for that state
to become a well-functioning belief (a ‘full-fledged belief’ one might say), it must
be integrated into one’s cognitive system. Furthermore, this process of integration is
justification conferring, because such properties as consistency and broad coherence
are justification conferring.26
An objector might insist that merely true beliefs possess value indistinguishable
from that possessed by justified true beliefs. But as we’ve suggested, there are good
empirical grounds to hold in many cases at least, such a merely true belief is likely to
crumble and vanish quickly, for what are, from the standpoint of the personal level,
inexplicable reasons. To be clear, our concern in this regard is not that a subject will be
easily swayed by reasons (good or bad) to give up a merely true belief—because, as
it’s sometimes claimed, a merely true belief isn’t, to use the Socratic metaphor, “tied
down” at the personal level. Rather, very often—again, even if not always—the belief
cannot even be the sort of stable thing that enters into reasons-sensitive relations until
it is justified and even then, often, only insofar as it continues to be justified at the
subpersonal level.27
Is the value in question noninstrumental? In some sense, it clearly is. If merely
true beliefs are unstable and prone to go out of existence before they even become
full-fledged belief-states—compare here with Socrates’ Statues of Daedalus in the
Meno28—integrated into the subject’s psychology, then for any given true belief that
P, whatever noninstrumental value the merely true belief that P has (or would have,
in virtue of being true), its justified counterpart has more of it, if only because it lasts
longer. We are not here committed to the view that there’s an undifferentiated value
provided by truth alone, and thus that any long-held, merely true belief—perhaps
a trivial one—might provide more value than any justified true belief held for, say,
2 weeks. We make no commitment either way about such cases. Rather, our arguments
depend only on the claim that when the subject and the true proposition are held fixed,
value accrues over time. We hold that, for a given subject, for a given belief that P, that
subject’s merely true belief that P typically has less value than that subject’s knowledge
state that P, if the latter persists longer than the former. Consider an analogy: if I were to
possess Picasso’s Guernica for two weeks, I would consider myself lucky; to possess
that very same painting for a year would add significantly more value to my aesthetic
treasures—even though it may be that there is no length of time such that my owning a
mediocre piece of art for that amount of time outweighs the value of owning Guernica
for two weeks. And, to describe the underlying comparison dramatically, the contrast,
at least in some cases, is not between S’s holding the mere true belief that P and
S’s holding a justified true belief with the corresponding content P; it is between S’s
26 See, for discussion of the value of such broad coherence, Sosa (1997).
27 This conclusion comports well with Ernest Sosa’s (1991) account of the value of what he calls reflective
knowledge, a value that derives from a true belief’s situatedness in a broadly coherent network of other true
beliefs.
28 These statues lacked a certain value, in and of themselves, given their disposition to run away if not
tethered down. The value of the statues is realised only in the presence of appropriate tethering.
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having no such merely true belief at all and S’s holding its justified counterpart. Clearly
the latter state of the subject is more noninstrumentally valuable, if there’s anything
noninstrumentally valuable at all about having the true belief in question; any positive
amount is greater than zero. And, less dramatically, in cases in which a merely true
belief exists but only for a brief time, its justified, longer-lived counterpart is of greater
value. By virtue of its existing as a true belief for a longer period, the latter accrues a
greater amount of whatever sort of noninstrumental value truth confers.
Another potential objection holds that the sorts of consolidation processes we have
in mind do not confer justification on beliefs, even if such processes enhance internal
consistency and coherence in the subject’s overall cognitive profile. After all, some
such processes serve merely to increase the coherence and maintain the consistency
of what to most of us would seem to be a ridiculous set of beliefs (pertaining, say, to
the subject’s conviction that alien abduction has occurred). Presumably, though, such
collections of beliefs (about alien abduction and the like) are thought to be ridiculous
because they are false, which pushes them outside both sets of beliefs that we mean
to be comparing—merely true beliefs and their counterpart knowledge states. Thus,
we can fairly set this concern aside.
We consider now a second argument:
Argument 2
A2. Premise 1. In many cases, subpersonal processes mediate the initial fixation of
the content of a mental representation and also sustain the relations that keep its
representational value fixed (by getting the mental representation into or keeping it
in the content-determining relation to property, kind, or individual represented).29
A2. Premise 2. Such relations often involve diagnostic relations among internal
representations and as such are, loosely speaking, inferential; schematically, mental
representation ‘a’ tracks As because (1) As reliably exhibit feature B, (2) mental
representation ‘b’ is causally sensitive to the presence of B, and (3) the activation
of ‘b’ tends to cause the activation of ‘a’.
A2. Intermediate conclusion 1. Subpersonal processes partly causally determine the
identity of proposition believed, and thus the belief itself, by determining some of
the elements of the proposition believed (by Premises 1 and 2 and Compositionality).
A2. Intermediate conclusion 2. In some cases, subpersonal cognitive processes
maintain a belief (or belief-like state), keeping it in existence by grounding the
tracking relations that determine the semantic content of components of the rep-
resentational structure that picks out the proposition the belief in question is an
attitude toward (a change in which would eliminate that belief—per Subvenience
and Belief Endurance).
A2. Premise 3. The internal causal relations between subpersonal states, which rela-
tions support the relevant tracking capacities, contribute to the belief’s (externalist)
justificatory status in ways that have no parallel structural at the personal level.
29 Such diagnostic or mediating relations need not be—in fact, in most cases are not—definitional relations
or expressions of necessary and sufficient conditions. On non-defining sustaining mechanisms that help to
fix and maintain the content of mental representations, see Fodor (1987, p. 121), Margolis (1998), and
Cowie (1999).
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A2 Premise 4. In contrast, a merely true counterpart belief is likely to go out of exis-
tence; for if it does not enter into the justification-related relations described—for
instance, subpersonal relations of diagnostic inference (or “inference”)—then it is
not likely to retain its content.
Therefore, for reasons parallel to those given in connection with Argument 1, a justified
true belief is, at least in many cases, more noninstrumentally valuable than a merely
true belief.
In support of A2, Premise 1, note that many of the ways in which humans skillfully
track individuals, property-types, and kinds in the environment rely on the detection of
so-called microfeatures, such as subtle differences in gait, scent, or silhouette. Perhaps
some such features can be articulated, but often—for example, in face recognition—we
can’t report on how reidentification occurs. We simply do it. The parents of identical
twins, for instance, often can tell the twins’ faces apart, even when others can’t, but
cannot accurately report how they do it.
In support of A2, Premise 2, we note that the relations in question diagnose the
presence of the individuals, kinds, or properties represented by the subpersonal units
on which the belief content supervenes and that this “diagnosing” relation is generally
of epistemic value. Consider a case in which one recognizes the presence of one’s pet
dog by slight differences in gait or scent, differences that one has difficulty articulating
or bringing clearly to consciousness. In such a case, it is because of the association
between subpersonal representations that one is plausibly justified in believing that
Fido is in the house. Moreover, Bayesian models of cognitive processing predom-
inate at the subpersonal level, which at least prima facie involve a justification or
confirmation-relation in response to the environment (see Clark 2015 for more on one
important class of Bayesian models).
In support of A2, Premise 4, consider at least the possibility that even slight
changes in detection routines—changes unreportable by the subject—could alter
belief-content, such that some beliefs would go out of existence; this seems especially
relevant in cases involving domains in which the targets of the beliefs in question
are barely discriminable, such as domains of expert perceptual discrimination. Imag-
ine someone who takes a botany course and who learns, but quickly forgets, what the
experts say about the different properties of tree leaves of very similar looking species.
How might she maintain beliefs about the properties of various species? Possibly, by
being able to track the different leaves and having the belief that that one can be eaten,
in a pinch, but that one should not be consumed under any circumstances. If, however,
her ability to discriminate between microfeatural differences of the different kinds of
leaves has suffered from degradation or interference, she no longer has the beliefs in
question. If, in contrast, the subpersonal relations in question are maintained, so too
are the relevant beliefs.
Of course, accessibilist internalists (Chisholm 1988; BonJour 1985) will likely
express doubts about the appeal to subpersonal processes. They are almost sure to claim
that subpersonal processes have nothing to do with justification, that consciousness
must have direct access to anything that counts as justification and that subjects do not
have conscious access to the states, relations, and processes in question.
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Consider, however, the following possibility. Imagine that various subjects hold
various beliefs that they take to be self-justifying or justified a priori (though perhaps
fallibly so)—most importantly, justified in the absence of personal-level justifying
relations. Now imagine that a pattern emerges: we secure evidence that a significant
subset of these beliefs are false and that there is a principled distinction between
the subpersonal processes that lead to the formation and maintenance of the true
ones, on the one hand, and the subpersonal processes that lead to the formation and
maintenance of the false ones, on the other hand. Focused on the personal level alone,
the accessibility internalist can appeal to no structure or process that would explain
the difference between the two kinds of cases; subjects report equal levels of certainty
attached to both kinds of beliefs, and they report not having based them in any way
on inferences. In this case, the internalist should accept that a mismatch argument
establishes a role for the subpersonal in the theory of justification. We maintain that
internalists should be similarly moved by mismatches of the sort we have discussed.
In many cases, the processes that validate the justificatory status of states accessible
to consciousness are subpersonal and lack any personal-level analogue.
Consider a final objection. One might worry that our discussion of subpersonal
phenomena—in particular, reasons for thinking that the sources of epistemic value
reveal themselves only (or at least largely) subpersonally—ignores broader conceptual
issues. What is it, one might wonder, about knowledge itself, that makes it valuable,
setting aside the way it appears or is maintained in a particular kind of physical system.
In fact, one might wonder whether all that we have said about the empirical cases can
be ignored. To the extent that we have addressed the swamping problem, it is by saying
something of the following sort: “justification adds value because it enhances stability
(or personal-level integration, or increases the amount of time one holds a given true
belief).” And, that could have been said without any detour through the empirical
literature or the exploration of subpersonal processing.
Here’s the rub, though. It’s not a conceptual truth that justified true beliefs are more
stable or less likely to go out of existence or more integrated than mere true beliefs,
and thus it does not suffice to solve the swamping problem merely to point to these
(possibly) personal-level traits. Sure enough, if justification is correlated with some
valuable characteristic F—whether it’s stability or cognitive integration or longer-
lasting truth—then justification adds value to true beliefs. But, we would like to know
whether, in fact, a belief’s being justified is correlated with the presence of F. That
might hold for some creatures, depending on the way they’re built, but not for others.
We would especially like to know whether humans are built in such a way that our
justified true beliefs are more stable, etc. than our merely true beliefs (and perhaps
thereby whether it’s possible for any creatures to be built in that way). We would
like to know that knowledge is in fact often valuable for us (and more valuable than
mere true belief), and one path to such a result is to see that the processes by which
justification appears in our case are correlated with stability, cognitive integration, or
longer-lasting truth.
Before closing, it will be helpful to register two summary points about the con-
clusions we have reached and to situate them in the context of the initial value
of knowledge debate with which we began. Firstly, and with reference to the
taxonomy introduced in the Introduction—including validationism, fatalism and revi-
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sionism—we take ourselves to have explored two importantly distinct strands of
validationism, both of which involve novel recourse to the subpersonal level, and
which have been hitherto ignored. The first strand of validationist response showed
how two leading attempts to defend validationist strategies—developed by Olsson and
Greco—would do well to incorporate subpersonal theoretical components; doing so
increases the chances that such approaches can offer viable and satisfying accounts of
the value of knowledge on their own favored terms. If this is right, then we’ve shown
an important respect in which the role of subpersonal processes has been overlooked
and has importance in epistemic axiology.
The second strand of validationist response, offered in Sect. 4, was comparatively
more ambitious. According to this strategy of response, the pretheoretical insight
that the value of knowledge exceeds that of mere true opinion can in principle be
vindicated exclusively at the subpersonal level of description. To be clear, we maintain
that our case for the philosophical import of the subpersonal in epistemic axiology
does not actually require this second strand of validationist response; the first strand
would suffice. We have, however, attempted to show how even this stronger strand of
validationist strategy has much to recommend it. In doing so, we offered two connected
arguments, each of which presented a novel way in which we envisage a subpersonal
response to the swamping problem being developed.
Finally, we admit, even emphasize, our limited understanding of the nature of the
subpersonal processes in question. But, we take ourselves to have provided sufficient
reason to be enthusiastic about the present approach as a way to make progress on
questions about epistemic value, generally speaking, and the swamping problem, in
particular.30
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